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SYMPOSIUM
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
IN AMERICA AND ABROAD
FOREWORD
Jed Handelsman Shugerman*
In the middle of the first panel of the Fordham Law Review symposium,
Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad, there was a pivotal, clarifying
moment. Zephyr Teachout and Lawrence Lessig had been framing modern
campaign finance as a problem of corruption—systematic and institutional
corruption. Richard Hasen rejected that framing, arguing that America’s
campaign finance system is not truly “corruption” in a legal sense, but rather
it is fundamentally a problem of inequality. In the middle of this debate,
Lessig admitted that he had been making a legal argument about corruption
pitched to the courts, but that the moral question is different:
I find it difficult to look at politicians and feel the moral force of the sense
that they are corrupt. I find it hard to go to Washington, meet with
members of Congress, and feel the moral force of, “You are a corrupt
person. What you’re doing is against the public interest.” Because when
I meet these people and talk to them, they are really decent people.
They’re people who, in general, think [that] what they are doing is for the
public good. Now, they’re wrong about a lot of it, and they are misguided
because of their obsessive focus on fundraising . . . . But what I feel [is]
the moral force here, it is the inequality.1

Lessig’s concession of the gap between his legal strategy and his moral
intuition was why Fordham University School of Law held a live symposium
and did not just publish of a handful of related papers. The Fordham
symposium brought out a spirited, provocative debate about corruption, and
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. This Foreword provides an
overview of the symposium entitled Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad held at
Fordham University School of Law.
1. Lawrence Lessig, Remarks at the Fordham University School of Law symposium,
Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad (Mar. 6, 2015). He then compares the inequality
of the old White Primary (racially restricted party primaries) to the new Green Primary
(financially restricted party primaries). Id. Racial inequality is more reprehensible, but he finds
both to be a sufficient basis for legal action. Id.
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Lessig’s reflection struck at one of the deeper problems with combatting
corruption: How do we define corruption, and how does that definition relate
to the real world fight against corruption? If we demonize corruption in the
abstract in order to mobilize against it, if our image of corruption is that it is
evil so that we might rally outrage against it, then what happens when we
engage with the much more mundane reality of institutional corruption in the
real world? We might call this problem the “banality of corruption.”2 What
happens when good, decent, well-intentioned people are asked to play by
corrupting rules? This is precisely what makes our modern campaign finance
crisis so insidious. If political corruption were simply a matter of politicians
getting caught on tape taking briefcases of cash from robber barons dressed
like Monopoly men with monocles, top hats, and villainous laughs, then we
wouldn’t have any legal or moral problems cracking down. And the majority
of politicians probably would have their own moral qualms about engaging in
such behavior. But our banal modern campaign finance system allows wellintentioned politicians to soothe their consciences, rationalize their behavior,
and rationalize this system. This more subtle corruption erodes their ethics
much more gradually and insidiously.
This dissonance between the intuitive image of individual corruption—
such as quid pro quo bribery—and the deeper structural problem of
institutional corruption creates legal challenges. For example, as a matter of
doctrine, the First Amendment prevails unless one can show a compelling
state interest that might trump it. In order to justify campaign finance
regulation, reformers follow the precedents and argue that anticorruption is a
compelling state interest.3 But this high-pitched rhetoric about corruption’s
evils often fails to match up with the everyday banality of campaign finance
influence peddling. Legally, Lessig is correct that the best strategy is to
portray unregulated campaign spending as corrupt, but our legal imaginations
often have not adjusted to the bigger picture. We are struggling with the
broader focus on campaign finance, and our legal system itself struggles with
the gray areas. The Articles for this symposium each confront the problems
with these gray areas in the battle against both foreign and domestic
corruption. To address the reality of corruption, we need a big-picture
institutional definition, but this symposium’s authors wisely recognize the
problems and shortcomings of such a broad definition.
The exchanges at the symposium and these Articles highlight the gap
between public opinion and legal culture on the definition of corruption and
the problems that flow from that gap. Teachout’s and Lessig’s legal
argument that corruption can be institutional and banal roughly corresponds
with the public’s moral intuition. Conversely, Lessig’s and Hasen’s intuitive
moral reaction—that corruption is the evil of quid pro quo—maps onto the
2. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL 287–88 (1963).
3. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 311–16 (2010); see also NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). See generally Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the
Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355 (2006).
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legal conclusion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC4 that
corruption is narrowly defined as quid pro quo. Note the reversal of moral
and legal positions: Teachout and Lessig’s legal argument tracks the public’s
moral sensibilities, while Lessig’s moral intuition tracks the Supreme Court’s
formalism.5 Legal culture certainly values precise line drawing and
formalism. Does that formalism also narrow our moral intuitions? Does it
make us more tolerant of institutional corruption?
These questions are one reason why Teachout’s Corruption in America:
From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuff Box to Citizens United is so important.6 Her
history demonstrates that the constitutional Framers understood that
corruption could be institutional, that democratic institutions could erode
gradually if they were flawed structurally, and that the Framers share this
understanding with the general public today.7 The lawyers’ formalistic and
narrow definition of corruption—embraced by today’s Court—is out of step
not only with modern public opinion, but also with the original understanding
of the constitutional project.
This Foreword focuses on a few related observations from the symposium.
First, it summarizes Teachout’s book, which inspired this symposium and
which relied on history to undermine Citizens United. Second, it suggests
that a more recent case in this Court’s Term, Williams-Yulee vs. Florida Bar,8
also erodes Citizens United, at least a bit, by recognizing a compelling state
interest in combating the appearance of corruption and bias in a new context:
by embracing that corruption lurks in gray areas and the banality of campaign
fundraising. Third, Pamela Karlan and Samuel Issacharoff once observed
that money in politics is like water: if you stop up one stream, the money
finds another way to flow.9 I pick up on Albert Alschuler’s critique of
overbroad criminalization of corruption10 to note how anticorruption reforms
are also hydraulic systems: if you dam up one source of reform, you flood
the other sources. The result of those dams leads to the unfair damnation of
public officials who run into zealous prosecutors and a powerful political
undertow. If the Court frustrates the ex ante regulation of campaign cash,
then other actors will step in ex post, and often without the right role or the
right fit for the structural problems. The history of campaign finance reform
demonstrates this pattern of hydraulic forces and unintended consequences.

4. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
5. See generally id. (generally adopting a formalist approach in defining corruption).
6. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF
BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014).
7. Id. at 32–55.
8. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2014).
9. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1998).
10. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Definitions of
Bribery Make Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (2015).
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I. TEACHOUT’S CORRUPTION IN AMERICA
Corruption in America traces the idea of “corruption” over American
history from the Revolution through the present.11 This is obviously an
ambitious project, but Teachout succeeds by focusing on legal institutions
and by writing so engagingly and accessibly. Teachout argues that
Americans have a broader, more capacious definition of corruption, rather
than the narrow definition the Court employs in Citizens United.12
Corruption historically has included not only bribes and fraud, but also
situations when public officials “serve private interests at the public’s
expense.”13 Teachout’s book is a mix of political history, legal challenge to
Citizens United, and call for reform.
The book can be divided into four parts, each with four chapters. The
first part focuses on the early Republic—how Americans then conceived of
corruption as the regard for self-interest over public interest and considered
it to be a national threat.14 Americans contrasted their new republic with a
European culture of corruption, embodied in the colorful stories of
Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and other officials struggling over
beautiful French gifts.15 In the Constitution, the Framers had prohibited
such gifts absent congressional approval. They embraced European notions
of virtue, civic republicanism, and law, together serving as a bulwark
against corruption.16 They embraced Montesquieu’s structure of the
separation of powers as a check against corruption.17 Teachout observes
that the word “corruption” was used hundreds of times in the convention
and the ratification debates, but less than 1 percent of those uses were in the
limited sense of quid pro quo that the Citizens United decision posited.18
Generally, their use of the word “corruption” reflected a broader meaning of
private interests and self-interest undermining public spiritedness. But she
also shows how the early republic era struggled with how to define and
correct corruption.19
The second part of the book turns to the nineteenth century, with
Americans confronting corruption, but still having trouble defining it as a
legal matter.20 The most interesting observation in this section is that state
legislatures initially avoided criminalizing bribery until after the Civil War,
but at the same time, they resolutely prohibited lobbying as a threat to civic
republicanism.21 Teachout offers an intriguing interpretation for how
lobbying reemerged as a legally acceptable activity in the late nineteenth
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 6.
See generally id. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
Id. at 2.
See id. at 17–101.
See id. at 17–31.
See id.
See id. at 40–44.
Id. at 50.
See id. at 81–124.
See id. at 102–82.
Id. at 161–65.
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century: the lobbyists changed their contracts to emphasize professional
skills, rather than personal influence; judges’ attitudes toward contracts
became more laissez-faire, opening the door to a more neutral acceptance of
lobbying contracts; and as free speech became a more robust legal concept,
lobbying became associated with the First Amendment.22 This section ends
with railroads and the transformation of funding for campaign finance—
changing from officeholders paying kickbacks to the party machine, to a
more familiar world of corporate donations.23
The corruption of the late nineteenth century triggered a reform campaign
in the early twentieth century, the topic of the book’s third section.24
Progressive era reformers adopted bright line rules as prophylactic
protections against corruption, including the prohibition on corporate
campaign spending that was eventually overturned in Citizens United.25 In
the mid-twentieth century, prosecutors creatively applied mail fraud statutes
to political corruption cases.26 The breadth of the statutes gave wide
latitude to prosecutors and jurors to define corruption.27 On top of these
new tools, Watergate led to new anticorruption statutes, but also set the
stage for Buckley v. Valeo28 and the Court’s equation of money with
speech. Teachout critiques Buckley, which struck down Congress’s limits
on how much candidates can spend,29 with an astute observation: the Court
simultaneously has been narrowing its definition of corruption while
broadening its definition of speech.30
In the fourth section of the book, which is a contemporary legal and
policy analysis, Teachout extends this critique by emphasizing a
constitutional balance of speech and equality values.31 She digs deeper into
Justice Kennedy’s limited definition of corruption as quid pro quo.32 Her
research into federal and state precedents shows that this definition was
exceedingly rare before 1976 and was essentially an invention of the
Roberts Court.33 She introduces the “anticorruption principle,” which is
more than simply balancing liberty with equality values;34 it revives the
civic republicanism and public spiritedness of the Founding era.35 She
concludes with a call for public financing of elections and a renewed
commitment to antimonopoly and trust busting.36
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 144–73.
Id. at 174–82.
See id. at 183–226.
See id.
Id.
Id.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 143–44.
TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 212–13.
See id. at 227–90.
Id.
Id. at 238–39.
Id. at 276.
See id. at 276–90.
See id. at 291–305.
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The book is not an archival history project, but rather a synthesis of
secondary historical work with some original primary research into the
Convention, ratification debates, and centuries of precedents. In order to
critique Citizens United, Teachout first dug deeply into the Founding era.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United rejected the
government’s argument that it had a compelling interest in restricting
independent corporate spending on campaigns.37 Kennedy acknowledged
that the government had an interest in combating corruption, but he
essentially limited the definition of corruption to quid pro quo exchanges,
and he concluded that independent expenditures did not rise to the level of
corruption.38 Teachout’s first section makes an originalist argument against
Kennedy’s conclusion by fleshing out the Founding era’s understanding of
corruption (and the interests which can limit the reach of the First
Amendment).39 Teachout relies on a series of animated struggles over gifts
from the French to American ambassadors, including Benjamin Franklin.40
Both the Articles of Confederation and Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution restricted the acceptance of foreign gifts.41 Even though gifts
are not the same as campaign donations, Teachout effectively uses these
anecdotes to illuminate the Founding generation’s “fixation” with the
problem of corruption and influence through the exchange of gifts and
money.42 Teachout offers a rich background from European history, and
from English and American interpretations of European history, to show
that the Framers understood how public virtue was vulnerable to corruption
through self-interest and materialism and how they hoped to protect virtue
with structural rules.43 She uses English political history and European
intellectual history to establish this frame of mind circa 1787.44 Teachout
focuses more on the Framers’ intent, even though more recent theories
about originalism have focused on “original public meaning,”45 by reading
popular debates in the press. Nevertheless, these early chapters on the
Framers are concise and effective at raising historical objections to Justice
Kennedy’s definition of corruption.
Unlike so many originalist projects, Teachout fills in the history between
then and now with well-chosen episodes and colorful characters. Her new
interpretations of those evolutionary steps are novel, significant
contributions. Her discussion of the Yazoo land-selling scandal of the
1790s shows that the Founding generation struggled with how to define
37. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010); see also TEACHOUT, supra
note 6, at 32–55.
38. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359.
39. See TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 17–80.
40. See id.
41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI;
TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 20, 26–27.
42. See TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 28.
43. See id. at 30–31.
44. See id.
45. Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning (Yale Law Sch.,
Public Law Research Paper No. 551) (book forthcoming 2016).
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corruption and how to remedy it.46 In Fletcher v. Peck,47 the Marshall
Court tolerated the selling of land that had originally been the product of
quid pro quo corruption in the Georgia legislature and even exercised
judicial review to overturn the following legislature’s effort to address the
Thus, even the Founding generation did not
corrupt dealings.48
aggressively rely on corruption as a government interest in trumping
contract rights and private reliance interests. The next chapters show how
antebellum Americans also struggled with providing remedies for
corruption—more often than not leaving it unremedied and unprosecuted.
Teachout’s book is accordingly balanced as opposed to one-sided.
The book is not conceived as a history with new archival sources, as
legal theory, or as a policy paper. Its strength is in its powerfully argued
narrative over the entirety of American history, synthesizing many different
strands of recent work in legal, political, and intellectual history. At the
same time, she offers original legal and historical research at key
moments.49 Her legal history has powerful relevance to contemporary legal
debates.
II. WILLIAMS-YULEE: A CRACK IN THE DAM OF CITIZENS UNITED?
In Citizens United, as discussed above, the Court ruled that the only
“sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption” is one that is “limited to quid pro quo
corruption.”50 Justice Kennedy, writing for a five person majority,
explained that the government interest in combating appearances of
corruption was sharply limited:
When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was
limited to quid pro quo corruption . . . . The appearance of influence or
access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our
democracy . . . . The fact that speakers may have influence over or access
to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.51

In Citizens United, the Court distinguished Caperton v. Massey Coal
Co.,52 in which a litigant had spent $3 million to defeat an unsympathetic
judge and elect a more sympathetic judge when his multimillion-dollar case
was pending.53 In Caperton, there was a legal cost as well as a financial
cost to such spending: the victorious judge had a duty to recuse himself
from the case. In Citizens United, the Court explained that Caperton
46. See TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 81–101.
47. 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
48. See TEACHOUT, supra note 6, at 81–101; see also Peck, 10 U.S. at 133–34.
49. See, e.g., TEACHOUT, supra, note 6 (discussing use of the word “corruption” in the
Founding debates and the use of the phrase quid pro quo in legal precedents over two
centuries).
50. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
51. Id. at 359–60.
52. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
53. See id. at 869.
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is not to the contrary. . . . The remedy of recusal was based on a litigant’s
due process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge . . . . Caperton’s
holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the
litigant’s political speech could be banned.54

But a case from the most recent Supreme Court Term was indeed to the
contrary. In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,55 the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the Florida Supreme Court’s rule prohibiting judicial candidates
from soliciting money directly.56 Accordingly, the Florida Bar disciplined
a judicial candidate for mailing and posting online a letter asking for
campaign funds.57 The Court upheld this ban in a five-to-four decision,
authored by Chief Justice John Roberts.58 Chief Justice Roberts revived the
significance of appearances, beyond the Roberts Court’s previous narrow
focus on quid pro quo bribery. Roberts explained that the states can curtain
the First Amendment in order to guard against the appearances of bias,
influence, and impropriety.59
In Caperton, Justice Kennedy was the fifth vote for a recusal rule for
substantial donors who appeared before the judge they supported, while
Roberts dissented.60 And intriguingly, Justice Kennedy ignored the phrase
“appearance of bias” and instead crafted a new phrase, “a probability of
bias.”61 As I have argued before, this switch was a mistake in terms of
precedent, doctrine, and policy.62 Justice Roberts returned to a traditional
emphasis on appearances, quoting Justice Frankfurter: “Justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice.”63 He continued in the same vein later in the
opinion, writing, “[I]t is the regrettable but unavoidable appearance that
judges who personally ask for money may diminish their integrity that
prompted the Supreme Court of Florida and most other States to sever the
direct link between judicial candidates and campaign contributors.”64
Justice Roberts continued: “As the Supreme Court of Oregon explained,
‘the spectacle of lawyers or potential litigants directly handing over money
to judicial candidates should be avoided if the public is to have faith in the
impartiality of its judiciary.’”65 From the problem of appearances and
spectacles of influence, he concluded that Florida was addressing a
compelling state interest of untoward appearances: “Here, Florida has
concluded that all personal solicitations by judicial candidates create a
public appearance that undermines confidence in the integrity of the
54. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354–55.
55. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
56. See Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379, 384 (Fla. 2014).
57. See id. at 388–89.
58. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667–71.
59. See id.
60. See Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 390 (2009).
61. See id.
62. See generally Jed H. Shugerman, In Defense of Appearances: What Caperton v.
Massey Should Have Said, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 529 (2010).
63. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670.
64. Id. at 1658.
65. Id. at 1672 (citing In re Fadeley, 310 Or. 548, 565 (1990)).
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judiciary; banning all personal solicitations by judicial candidates is
narrowly tailored to address that concern.”66 In these passages, Justice
Roberts adopts the more systemic and institutional approach to the problem
of corruption. He refuses to apply the “crabbed” interpretation of
corruption as limited to quid pro quo or its appearance.67 He focuses on the
broader problems of influence—“fear [and] favor”—and the general
dynamics of integrity and public confidence.68 In this case about judges, he
adopts the Framers’ (and Teachout’s) understanding of public corruption,
rather than the Citizens United definition.
Chief Justice Roberts is unmistakably clear that his concern for
appearances of integrity and independence is limited to the judiciary. Chief
Justice Roberts states early in his opinion:
Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of
the ballot. And a State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it
to treat judicial candidates like campaigners for public office. A State
may assure its people that judges will apply the law without fear or
favor—and without having personally asked anyone for money.69

The compelling interest is limited to “preserving public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary.”70 Justice Scalia mocks the Chief Justice’s
allegiance to “the Brotherhood of the Robe,” carving out special First
Amendment rules for judicial candidates because of their unique role.71
But might a future Court recognize that there is a vital interest in integrity
for all public offices, or a compelling interest in public confidence that
legislators and executives are acting fairly and not acting primarily out of
fear or favor? The heightened significance of impartiality for judges
justifies bans on direct solicitations in their races and not for all races.
Nevertheless, the vital importance of integrity—and the appearance of
integrity—for all other offices might justify some set of less restrictive
speech regulations (not rising to the level of banning solicitations, but
instead upholding limitations on corporate donations and independent
spending). Williams-Yulee opens the door to such a debate about a range of
interests in public confidence in our democratic institutions and,
accordingly, a broader range of campaign finance regulations. A future
justice might agree with Scalia’s critique of Roberts’s “Brotherhood of the
Robe” and might agree with Scalia that judges are not so fundamentally
different from other elected officials.72 But instead of Justice Scalia’s
application of this equivalence—to strike down campaign finance
restrictions for all judges and all other officials—this future justice might
66. Id. at 1664.
67. See id. at 1660–68.
68. Id. at 1660.
69. Id. at 1662.
70. Id. at 1659–60; see also id. at 1659 (describing the vital interest in Caperton as
“safeguarding ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges’”
(citation omitted)).
71. Id. at 1673.
72. Id. at 1682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

416

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

extend Williams-Yulee’s value of the appearances and public confidence in
integrity of all offices and would be the fifth vote needed to overturn
Citizens United.
III. HYDRAULICS OF MONEY AND REFORM
Several scholars have compared campaign finance reform to hydraulics.
Money in politics is like water: if you build a dam in one place, the water
will find another way to flow downhill. In the most famous discussion of
this metaphor, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, Samuel
Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan explain:
Our account, then, is “hydraulic” in two senses. First, we think political
money, like water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into
thin air. Second, we think political money, like water, is part of a broader
ecosystem. Understanding why it flows where it does and what functions
it serves when it gets there requires thinking about the system as a
whole.73

Their point is that reformers have to think big picture about institutions,
power, and deeper political structures. “[E]very reform effort to constrain
political actors produces a corresponding series of reactions by those with
power to hold onto it.”74 Issacharoff and Karlan offer a few examples
related to redistricting and gerrymandering,75 but their strongest example is
the failure of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 to
reduce the role of big donors.76
It turns out that campaign finance offers an even more powerful historical
example of water finding new paths downhill when dams block the old
path. For most of the nineteenth century, the structure of American campaign
finance was a direct and open system of officeholder patronage kickbacks,
called “assessments.” Party officials demanded assessments—cash payments
as a percentage of one’s salary—from public employees who got their jobs
through party allegiances.
The original two-party system’s coalitions ran on the spoils system, and
they “were held together ‘only by the cohesive power of public plunder.’”77
Party machines got party leaders into office, and then those officers
rewarded their machines and supporters by appointing them to lucrative

73. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 9, at 1708.
74. Id. at 1705.
75. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986). But see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–
1973b-1 (1994); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 (2004); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 648 (1993); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977). See generally
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Pamela S.
Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV.
245 (1993).
76. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–56 (1994).
77. KURT HOHENSTEIN, COINING CORRUPTION: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM 15 (2007) (quoting RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877–1900 17 (2000)).
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government offices.78 The assessment system “became the most important
financial source for campaign contributions.”79 A Pennsylvania example of
an assessment form letter demanded: “Two percent of your salary is ___.
Please remit promptly. At the close of the campaign we shall place a list of
those who have not paid in the hands of the head of the department you are
in.”80 Many assessments were in the range of 10 to 12 percent of one’s
salary.81 The federal government expanded enormously during and after
the Civil War,82 and the assessments on federal officeholders “provided the
main and steadiest source of campaign contributions.”83 However, the
growth of the size of government during the Civil War and Reconstruction
also drew more attention to the size of budgets and the growth of taxes.
These changes drew more public attention and more public criticism of
waste and corruption.84
Reformers passed three major statutes prohibiting assessments85: the
Naval Appropriations Act of 1867, the 1876 Anti-Assessment Act, and the
Pendleton Act of 1883, which created the federal government’s first major
civil service reforms.86 From 1876 to 1883, political assessments “declined
precipitously.”87 The Anti-Assessment legislation led to a “sea change in
the manner in which political parties would raise and spend campaign
funds.”88 Public opinion had demanded budget cutting, and congressmen
saw easy cuts in government salaries. If federal officials were only taking
home 80 to 90 percent of their salary due to assessments, then they knew
they could abolish assessments, cut salaries by 10 to 20 percent, and the
officials would be left with the same take-home pay.89 But reform is slow
and easily evaded: the Anti-Assessment Act was not enforced for six
years.90 Then the assassination of President James A. Garfield in 1881 by a
spurned office seeker shocked the nation, focused attention on the
patronage/corruption problem, and changed public opinion. Newly elected
President Chester A. Arthur suddenly changed his policy from pro78. See id.
79. Id. at 19; see also ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT, 1865–1883 2–5 (1961); E.L. Godkin, The Democrats
and Civil Service Reform, THE NATION, Dec. 2, 1880, at 388.
80. GEORGE THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TREE? AMERICAN CAMPAIGN FINANCING
PRACTICES FROM 1789 TO THE PRESENT 38 (1973).
81. Id.
82. See HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 14; MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC
LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 239 (1977).
83. HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 15.
84. Id. at 13–15; see also THAYER, supra note 80, at 38–40. See generally
HOOGENBOOM, supra note 79.
85. HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 16.
86. See id. at 13–62; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 79, at 198–252; RAYMOND J. LA RAJA,
SMALL CHANGE: MONEY, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 17–26
(2008).
87. See HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 24; see also HOOGENBOOM, supra note 79, at
225–26.
88. See HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 13–14.
89. Id. at 21.
90. See HOOGENBOOM, supra note 79, at 226.
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patronage to pro-reform, and the Republicans in Congress worked with the
reform wing of the Democratic Party to pass the Pendleton Act.91 The
Pendleton Act is known primarily for establishing the first major civil
service reforms, but its most powerful change at the time was cracking
down even more firmly on political assessments.92 “The post-Pendleton
weaning of the parties from assessment-sourced funding, coupled with the
growth and rising influence of national corporations within the political
system, by 1896 reshaped the structure of campaign financing that would
remain essentially unchanged until 1971.”93
These events “caused both political leaders and American businessmen to
reexamine their role in national campaign finance issues.”94
As
assessments disappeared, the costs of elections were simultaneously
accelerating in the 1880s and 1890s. Corporate spending replaced the
assessments and led to the modern campaign finance system.95 The decline
on assessments coincided with sudden increase in corporate power. The
industry took advantage of the changes to dominate party politics. Both
Democrats and Republicans depended on corporate spending, and
legislators developed strategies to target businesses for donations.96 The
“squeeze bill” or “frying the fat” was a way for legislators to hold
corporations’ feet to the fire and fry the fat out of them with threats of
hostile legislation.97 Party bosses bargained to ditch the bills only once the
targeted businesses donated money.98 But as businesses paid more and
more money to parties, they gained the upper hand in being able to control
the parties.
Crony patronage transformed into crony capitalism. The 1884 election
was significant in how both parties’ presidential candidates pursued the
support of big business and the robber barons.99 In 1888, Republicans had
an advantage in corporate donations, but the Democrats competed
evenly.100 The 1896 election was the peak of corporate involvement; it is
an election that stands out as the most expensive election in American
91. Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
92. See THE REGULATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, S. REP. No. 46-872
(1881); HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 25, 27; see also HOOGENBOOM, supra note 79, at
245–46; KELLER, supra note 82, at 243; Ari Hoogenboom, The Pendleton Act and the Civil
Service, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 301, 303 (1959); Reform Cheap for Cash, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1876, at 4.
93. See HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 48.
94. See id. at 14; see also HOOGENBOOM, supra note 79, at 195–97; cf. Dean
McSweeney, Parties, Corruption, and Campaign Finance in America, in PARTY FINANCE
AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION 37, 54–59 (Robert Williams ed., 2000); ROBERT D. MARCUS,
GRAND OLD PARTY: POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN THE GILDED AGE, 1880–1896 59–100 (1971);
PAUL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE 110–11 (1958). See
generally MARK WAHLGREEN SUMMERS, THE ERA OF GOOD STEALINGS (1993).
95. See HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 31.
96. See id.; THAYER, supra note 80, at 46.
97. See HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77; THAYER, supra note 80, at 46.
98. See THAYER, supra note 80, at 46–50; HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 13–16.
99. See HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 30–37.
100. See THAYER, supra note 80, at 39–40.
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history (and by far the most expensive as a matter of per capita spending or
as a percentage of gross domestic product).101 Political financier Mark
Hanna raised $3.5 million for William McKinley, and McKinley’s total was
almost $7 million, compared to the mere few hundred thousand raised for
William Jennings Bryan.102 Ever since the elections of the 1880s and
1890s, large donations from special interests have been the foundation of
the American campaign finance system. One scholar observed that the
campaign finance system underwent one of its most significant changes in
the 1880s and 1890s and then once again in the Watergate era of the mid1970s.103
The Articles in this symposium reflect this same problem of hydraulics.
Again, once you stop money at one source, it finds another way to flow into
the political system. Richard Hasen takes up Teachout’s claim that campaign
contributions start a slippery moral slope toward bribery and cause criminal
corruption. Hasen critiques this link, noting that there are relatively few
corruption cases in Congress and that there seems to be no correlation
between the level of caps on individual donations and the amount of
corruption. Instead, Hasen suggests that the rate of corruption is correlated to
the distance of the state capital from the state’s media center. Hasen’s
explanation is that when a state capital is more distant from the state’s major
city and media center, this remoteness gives politicians more of a sense of
being insulated from scrutiny, which leads them to engage in more and more
corruption. If this dynamic is true, it is a great example of reform efforts
backfiring. For the national capital, the Founders chose not Philadelphia,
New York, or Boston, but instead, they chose a swamp resting between
Maryland and Virginia. The chief explanation for this placement in the South
was that the first Congress needed to coax the South into a compromise on
state debts. But the early Republic’s leaders also wanted the capital to be
independent from any one state, and they wanted the capital to be insulated
from the influence of major commercial centers. This compromise in 1790,
with the goal of appeasing Southern politicians, placed the capital far from
the Northern centers of commerce and outside Southern cities, too—a
swampy blank slate free of preexisting influences. Note, too, how so many
states chose capitals far away from the state’s commercial, financial, and
cultural centers. This is one reason why memorizing state capitals was such a
challenge in elementary school. Many state capitals were purposely obscure:
Albany, rather than New York; Harrisburg, rather than Philadelphia;
Columbia, rather than Charleston; Hartford, rather than New Haven;
Annapolis, rather than Baltimore; Baton Rouge, rather than New Orleans;
Sacramento, rather than San Francisco or Los Angeles; et cetera. If the
101. See Matthew O’Brien, The Most Expensive Election Ever: . . . 1896?, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/11/the-mostexpensive-election-ever-1896/264649/ [http://perma.cc/XRZ7-MSZT]. These figures are
based on adjusted dollars to present value, based on percent of gross domestic product and/or
per capita spending.
102. HOHENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 60.
103. See id.
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leaders in these states hoped that distant commercial powers would insulate
officials from corruption, then Hasen’s findings may suggest that the
insulation backfired: distance created a feeling of protection from media
scrutiny and promoted a culture of corruption.
Hasen’s Article relies on a study by Harry Enten on patterns of corruption
in the states.104 Enten’s research also points to another mismatch between
legal reform and the reality of corruption105: states with the strictest ethics
laws often have the highest number of official corruption cases. Why? The
causal arrows are reversed: ethics laws do not decrease a culture of
corruption; rather, a culture of corruption triggers a response of enacting more
ethics laws, which do not actually change the culture. The money still flows
despite reform.
Another example of anticorruption efforts backfiring appears in Jay
Holtmeier’s Article on cross-border corruption enforcement. When one
nation has clear and predictable anticorruption laws, many corporations will
self-report violations in order to offer up cases involving corrupt individuals
and to avoid larger punishments for the entire corporation. One might think
that multiple nations cracking down on corruption would increase
compliance; on the contrary, the gaps between different nations’ legal
definitions of corruption and the lack of predictability have a chilling effect
on self-reporting. Other Articles in this symposium reflect a different kind of
hydraulics: corruption as market competition106 and as supply and
demand.107
Perhaps the most troubling example of the hydraulics of campaign finance
is in Albert Alschuler’s Article. Alschuler argues that criminal prosecution is
a deeply flawed way of cracking down on political corruption. The
definitions of corruption have become too broad, leading to a lack of fairness
across cases, with too much prosecutorial discretion, whim, and partisan
abuse. I suggest that this is another example of hydraulics: demand for
reform is also like water. As the Court dams up structural reform of the
campaign finance system, the demand for anticorruption flows to other parts
of the government. The legislature responds to public frustration, but when
those efforts at structural reform are overturned, the next solution is
piecemeal, case-by-case targeting of reform, i.e., criminal charges.
104. See Richard L. Hasen, Why Isn’t Congress More Corrupt?: A Preliminary Inquiry,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (2015).
105. Harry Enten, Ranking the States from Most to Least Corrupt, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Jan. 23, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/ranking-the-states-from-most-toleast-corrupt/ [http://perma.cc/RT9H-KCEW].
106. Mike Koehler, The Uncomfortable Truths and Double Standards of Bribery
Enforcement, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 525 (2015). Koehler observes that U.S. law has a double
standard in that it punishes private influence with cash as bribery, but permits government
with cash as legitimate foreign policy. I would suggest that one effect of this legal
arrangement is that political influence is a kind of market: if a government can eliminate
competition from private sources, it increases the relative power of its own public sources.
107. Lucinda A. Low, Sarah R. Lamoree & John London, The “Demand Side” of
Transitional Bribery and Corruption: Why Leveling the Playing Field on the Supply Side
Isn’t Enough, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 563 (2015).
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Prosecutors—some well-intentioned hydraulic engineers, others exploiting
the political situation—overzealously pursue criminal charges. Alschuler
rightly notes that prosecution is not a fair or effective way to remedy the deep
and muddy problems of influence and special interests in American politics.
United States Attorney Preet Bharara’s keynote address focused on
prosecution as the remedy for corruption, which is too narrow a view of the
systemic problem.108 Like the Roberts Court and the legal formalists, he
portrays the problem of corruption in terms of the “bad folks,” who commit
fraud, bribe, and break the law, and the good folks, who sometimes fail to
report this criminal behavior.109 Considering Bharara’s position as U.S.
Attorney, his viewpoint is understandable. But we must keep in mind that
corruption does not address the “good folks” who play by the rules, though
those rules lead to systemic corruption.
And this brings us back to Larry Lessig’s moral qualms. Prosecution is for
the truly morally corrupt individuals, for the quid pro quo. For the structural
problem of fear and favor, of institutional corruption by design, the solution is
structural change. But when the Court puts dams in front of structural
change, we are left with the powerful hydraulic waves finding other channels
for reform. We get stuck thinking that corruption is a matter of evil and
criminal law. And the courts’ legal dams in constitutional law create
unintended consequences of injustice, the unfair damnation of public officials
as criminal defendants. Until we transform our understanding of corruption
from an effort to condemn individuals to an effort to fix with broader
institutional reform, we will be out of touch with the Framers’ eighteenthcentury vision of democracy, and we will be out of luck in the twenty-first
century as well.

108. Preet Bharara, Keynote Address: Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 601 (2015).
109. Id. at 605.

